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DIMENSION OF WORK: 
TOWARDS THE DEMOCRATISATION OF WORK 
Helena Lopes 
Work is being devalorised today as never before, and the quality of 
working life is deteriorating almost everywhere. Despite this, work issues 
are addressed by a decreasing number of economists, even heterodox 
economists. Normative claims about how work should be organised are 
increasingly handed over to managerial sciences, a process that 
contributes to legitimatising the long-standing liberal contention that 
work governance is an exclusively private matter. It is as if economists 
had renounced the study of the world of work and the furthering of 
changes that would bring about desirable social and economic outcomes.  
This state of affairs is explained not only by historical and ideological 
factors but also by the way in which work is conceptualised by most 
economists and social philosophers. For mainstream economists, work is 
an instrumental activity in which socially dis-embedded individuals 
engage for the sole reason of having access to consumption. Leading 
philosophers, like Hannah Arendt and Jurgen Habermas, also view work 
as an instrumental activity in which workers relate with nature and enter 
into strategic relations with each other. Since the public sphere is defined 
by non-strategic interaction among equal individuals, work is relegated 
to the private, non-political domain. In our view, this instrumental, 
depoliticised, conception of work and its consequent exclusion from the 
public sphere has contributed to underrating work and is progressively 
removing it from ‘elevated’ academic matters.    
The aim of the present article is to argue that workplaces are political (in 
the Arendtian sense) arenas and that work has an irreducible political and 
public dimension. Although this approach runs against the dominant 
contention, we are not alone in our endeavour. Authors such as Pateman 
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(1970), Honneth (1982) and Ferreras (2007) have also been advocating 
the recognition of the public character of work. We develop our 
argument in three steps that go from an analytical to a normative stance.  
Firstly, we point out that the instrumental conception regards work as a 
relationship between workers and nature, not a relationship with each 
other. In economics, the instrumental conception of work had been 
forged by the marginalists, the very economists that removed the 
relations between people from the domain of economic analysis. Yet 
work activities are almost always undertaken within a network of social 
interactions, many of which, pace Habermas, are not of a strategic 
nature. Institutional economics and sociological approaches have long 
assumed that work is a collective, cooperative venture enduringly 
permeated by normative concerns and aspirations for justice – the 
concerns and aspirations considered constitutive of the public and 
political sphere. It is the recognition of the cooperative character of work 
that allows its public dimension to be unveiled.   
The second part of the article examines the extent to which the 
conditions for a public sphere, as conceived by Habermas and Arendt, 
are met in private business workplaces, and whether these conditions are 
effectively required for an arena to be considered public. Our conception 
of work leads us to question the private/public distinction in 
contemporary societies and discuss equality as a criterion for a public 
sphere.  
The third part argues that the ‘publicness’ of work is not solely a 
theoretical matter but also a political issue. Some of the normative 
counterparts of the recognition of the public character of work are 
explored. Firstly, if an issue is public it must be accessible to debate and 
public scrutiny. We point out that the opposite is currently observed: the 
demands of competitiveness are used to render the changes undertaken in 
the world of work almost invisible and, most importantly, unquestioned. 
For instance, there is almost no censure of the current intensification of 
work (Green, 2006). Secondly, if work is recognised as having a public 
dimension, policies aimed at promoting the democratisation of work 
become necessary and legitimate. Indeed, workplaces should then be 
subject to the same principle that applies to the public sphere, namely the 
maximum possible participation of all those involved. 
The next section briefly presents the relevant conceptions of work for our 
purposes and argues, contra Arendt (1958), that work is a political 
THE POLITICAL AND PUBLIC DIMENSION OF WORK     7 
 
activity. The following section builds on Arendt (1958) and Habermas 
(1989) to examine the extent to which work can be regarded as 
embodying a public dimension. The penultimate section develops the 
normative corollaries generated by the acknowledgement of work as 
public, namely the need to democratise various aspects of work. We 
conclude by highlighting that re-politicising and re-dignifying the 
concept of work would help its emancipatory potential to be retrieved. 
Recognising the Political Character of Work 
Work as an Instrumental and Solitary Activity  
Mainstream economists portray work as a production factor for firms and 
a source of disutility for workers, an unpleasant activity which people 
would avoid if they could. It is assumed that workers entertain an 
instrumental relationship with work, seen as merely a means to the ‘real’ 
end, i.e. consumption1. Non-incidentally, the authors who formalised this 
vision of work, the early marginalists, are also those who restricted the 
object of economics to the study of the relations between people and 
nature. For them, economics would deal exclusively with the ‘lower 
elements of human nature’ (Edgeworth, 1881), that is, self-interest and 
the search for material wealth.  
Although mainstream economics meanwhile reintroduced the study of 
social interactions, by inserting social preferences into utility functions, 
economic agents’ behaviour remains basically instrumental. Social 
relations are just means by which, or constraints within which, 
individuals pursue utility-maximisation; the individualistic grounds of 
rational choice theory are left untouched. The worker as a producer 
embedded in a social productive context has no place in mainstream 
economic theory, in which the worker is seen as a consumer. For 
example, in the theory of compensating wage differentials, workers buy 
the positive attributes of their jobs. 
In turn, contemporary social philosophy is marked by the under-rating of 
work, which contributed to dismantling the emancipatory status of the 
                                                 
1  Institutional economists, by contrast, have always challenged this view, 
highlighting the fact that work could also be a privileged means for human 
flourishing (Spencer, 2009; Lopes, 2011). 
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19th-century concept of work (Honneth, 1982 and Ferreras, 2007). The 
theoretical milestones along this path are Arendt and Habermas, for 
whom work involves the relations between people and nature like in 
mainstream economics.   
For Habermas, work broadly refers to the way individuals control and 
manipulate their environment.  Work is regulated by the technical rules 
that govern the interactions between people and nature; it is hence 
typically and necessarily an externally regulated type of behaviour. 
Though he recognises that work activity is immersed in social 
interactions, he makes a sharp distinction between work and interaction 
(Habermas, 1968). Work as an activity and the relations in which 
individuals enter while at work belong to the domain of 
instrumental/strategic action. Work is an instrumental action which 
consists of finding the best technical means in the pursuit of predefined 
goals.  In turn, relationships established at work are regarded as strategic 
action - consisting of choosing the right strategy for one’s goals while 
knowing that others are also pursuing their own goals.  In workplaces 
then, it is assumed that individuals view their co-workers as if they were 
objects or organisational resources, likely to be manipulated when 
necessary. For Habermas, workplaces are governed by the diktats of 
instrumental reason, as are all other economic affairs. 
In contrast to work, interaction is oriented by the mutual search for 
understanding and is associated to communicative action. The latter is 
governed by social norms shared by the interacting individuals and is 
characterised by the absence of coercive force. While individuals at work 
relate primarily with nature, communicative action is a fundamentally 
dialogic activity, marked by authentic rather than strategic interaction. 
For Habermas, communicative action is the cement of social order; a 
society would not hold together with instrumental action alone. But he 
sees communicative action as being possible only among free and equal 
individuals, that is, outside of work, in the public sphere. 
Habermas’ framework meets Arendt’s theorisation of the human 
condition as constituted by three activities: labour, work and (political) 
action. Labour and work are instrumental activities - they are directed to 
a goal other than themselves – in contrast to action, which lies outside 
the category of means and ends because the end lies in the activity itself 
– political action. Labour refers to the repetitive and never-ending 
activities in which humans must engage to sustain the physiological 
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requirements of life. Individuals as labourers are bound to necessity and 
produce things that are by definition perishable. Work refers to the 
activities through which humans transform the physical world in which 
they live. While the products of labour are designed to be consumed, 
those of work are characterised by permanence and durability. But in 
labour, as in work, individuals relate only with nature and not with each 
other.    
With regard to the way social interactions are envisaged at work, 
Arendt’s position is even more radical than Habermas’:  
Laboring is an activity in which man is neither together with the 
world nor with other people, but alone with his body, facing the 
naked necessity to keep himself alive. […] It is indeed in the 
nature of laboring to bring men together in the form of a labor 
gang where any number of individuals ‘labor together as if they 
were one’. […] But this ‘collective nature of labor’, far from 
establishing a recognizable, identifiable, reality for each member 
of the labor gang, requires on the contrary the actual loss of all 
awareness of individuality and identity. […] The sociability 
arising out of [labor] rests not on equality but on sameness 
(Arendt, 1958: 212-213).  
That is, in the realm of labour, human beings are all alike because they 
are mere living organisms, stuck to materiality; they are thus 
interchangeable rather than unique and distinct individuals. Likewise, in 
the realm of work, human beings fabricate ‘the man-made-world’ in 
solitude. The two concepts do not differ significantly in what concerns 
relations between people. 
In contrast, Arendt understands that action, like Habermas with 
communicative action, goes on directly between individuals without the 
intermediary of things, and this enables individuals to disclose ‘who’ 
they are.  Only through action, i.e., through interacting with others 
through words and deeds, can individuals reveal their individuality and 
display their virtue and character. Only action takes place among a 
plurality of people; hence, only in the realm of action can individuals be 
equals and distinct. Action refers specifically and exclusively to the 
activities involved in our living together; it excludes ‘everything merely 
necessary or useful’, that is, labour and work.  
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Beyond Instrumentality 
So Arendt and Habermas, like mainstream economics, make two distinct 
but related contentions:  i) work is an instrumental activity; and ii) 
workplaces are inhabited by indistinct, un-individuated, people who only 
relate instrumentally to each other. Regarding the first assertion, it is 
important to recall that prominent thinkers, one of whom is Marx, 
believed work to be valuable in itself rather than an instrument to 
something else, because work allows human beings to exercise their 
creative powers and hence achieve self-realisation (Spencer, 2009). For 
Marx, contrary to Arendt and Habermas, work is not in itself an 
alienating activity. Rather, it is the capitalist system of work that impedes 
the potential for work to become a positive and creative activity. Within 
capitalism, the hallmark of human work, i.e. to simultaneously conceive 
and execute, is dissolved because capitalists control the labour process 
and render work a purely functional activity performed to earn wages.  
But the focus of the present article is to counter the second assertion by 
arguing that social interactions at work go beyond instrumentality. Our 
argument rests on two claims: first that workers today aspire to 
egalitarian, democratic interactions, and second that work entails 
cooperative behaviour.  
The first claim consists of acknowledging that the egalitarian interaction 
regime specific to our democracies pervades all interpersonal exchanges, 
including interactions at work. Indeed, since the concepts of work are 
always informed by their historical contexts, the conception of work 
today must situate it in the contemporary context of democratic societies. 
Even though democracy stops at the firms’ doors, hierarchical decisions 
do not go unquestioned. Democracy does not abolish the existence of 
bosses and employees, but it alters the rationale underlying human 
interactions and creates a tension between the norm of equal status in the 
wider polity and that of subject status in the workplace which must be 
acknowledged. Even when the interaction context is hierarchical, there is 
an inescapable aspiration to relational horizontality (Martucelli, 2002) 
and fair treatment. Workers expect to be treated and recognised as 
distinct and morally able individuals (McGann, 2012). Expecting 
interactions at work to be egalitarian, or at least respectful of integrity 
and dignity, means expecting behaviours to be driven by social norms 
rather than by exclusively instrumental concerns. Treating others and 
being treated according to such norms imply the endorsement of justice 
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principles, which by definition goes beyond instrumentality. 
The second claim and decisive theoretical point is the acknowledgement 
of the cooperative character of work. Because Arendt conceives 
workplaces as inhabited by indistinct and interchangeable individuals, 
she explicitly rejects that work entails some form of cooperation:  
Division of labor is based on the fact that two men can put their 
labor power together and behave toward each other as though 
they were one. This one-ness is the exact opposite of co-
operation, it indicates the unity of the species with regard to 
which every single member is the same and exchangeable 
(Arendt, 1958: 123).  
However, while well-defined tasks can be efficiently coordinated by 
hierarchical mechanisms, most modern productive activities require a 
high level of interdependence between workers. The workers’ goals and 
effort levels cannot be defined independently; instead, the workers must 
together develop a common understanding of the problem to be solved 
and how this can be done. In collective endeavours, the definition of each 
member’s contribution is endogenous to the group; it can only be arrived 
at by communicative and cooperative processes. Cooperation means that 
(a) the workers commit to certain behaviour and (b) compliance with 
commitments take on crucial importance. Cooperating implies giving up 
on one’s desire to cheat or exploit cooperative partners; it instead entails 
respecting others as unique persons and treating them fairly. This 
amounts to going beyond what is ‘merely necessary or useful’ and 
ceasing to behave instrumentally.  
Acknowledging that workers do cooperate therefore means recognising 
that they relate with each other as distinct, unique, moral individuals. In 
fact, the very abilities required to sustain cooperation, namely, making 
promises and fulfilling commitments, are assigned exclusively to 
(political) action by Arendt and communicative action by Habermas. But 
once we recognise that work is permeated by egalitarian aspirations and 
cooperative behaviour, it follows that the processes assigned to the 
political sphere, i.e. individuation and distinctiveness, can also take place 
in workplaces. Arendt’s distinctions between labour, work and action are 
undoubtedly illuminating. They allowed her to brilliantly show how 
modern societies became societies of labourers/consumers in which men 
and women endlessly produce in order to consume, and consume in order 
to produce. But Arendt built her argument about the overwhelming place 
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of labour and consequent decline of action in modernity by elaborating 
abstract categories that led her to sidestep the practical circumstances in 
which labour and work are actually undertaken.  
Neoclassical economists had also resisted recognising the existence and 
importance of cooperation in economic affairs, but they have been 
acknowledging it in the last decades. Nevertheless, in mainstream 
accounts the bed-rock of cooperation is made of calculating the relative 
costs/benefits of alternative actions – that is, it is assumed that people 
cooperate for self-interested, instrumental reasons. But while cooperation 
undoubtedly entails a calculative facet, it also inevitably requires the 
relational and moral capacity of individuals. The conditions required to 
sustain cooperation in the formal mainstream models – complete 
information about others’ past behaviour, endless interaction and 
sanctioning possibility - are simply not met in real-world contexts 
(Kotzebue and Wigger, 2010).  
The next section briefly presents Arendt’s definition of the ‘political’ and 
further develops the idea that work has a political dimension. Again, our 
argument is mostly grounded on the actual experience of work. 
Sociology of work forcefully shows that work does not consist solely of 
a series of tasks carried out in an objective world but is also made up of 
how work is subjectively experienced, perceived and interpreted; 
however, this perspective is seldom taken in social philosophy and 
economics, which continue to understand work as separated from 
subjectivity and, most importantly, intersubjectivity. 
The Political Dimension of Work 
Arendt explicitly states that labour is an ‘antipolitical way of life’ 
(Arendt, 1958: 212) because, as mentioned above, she assumes that in 
the activity of labour, human beings do not relate as unique and distinct 
persons. For her, it is only through (political) action that individuals can 
distinguish themselves as distinct and unique beings, that is, only action 
makes people political beings. Because humans engage in labour and 
work to fulfil the same biological and material needs, there is no scope 
for individuality, just for sameness. Individuality would only emerge 
from interacting with others through ‘words and deeds’. Only through 
action and speech, that is, political activity, can individuals show who 
they are and disclose their unique identities. When Arendt speaks of 
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speech, she is referring to the act of ‘communicating oneself’ rather than 
communicating to obtain something. Action for her refers to 
‘communicative action’, in which words are not strategically used to veil 
intentions but instead to disclose one’s real self. Indeed, ‘the polis […] is 
the organization of the people as it arises out of acting and speaking 
together’ (Arendt, 1958: 198).  
Arendt believes that the organising principle 2  itself derives from the 
political realm; it is related to people’s capacity to act together. Yet once 
we recognise that there is an inescapable cooperative dimension in work, 
it logically follows that the organising principle also permeates work 
environments. Indeed, as mentioned above, by definition cooperating 
implies that workers organise themselves; cooperating entails working 
together, acting, discussing, deciding together and behaving ‘virtuously’ 
toward each other. The exercise of virtue is precisely the motive 
underlying action in Arendt’s framework. And virtue stems from human 
beings' ability to see things not only from their own point of view but 
also from the perspective of all those with whom they interact. 
In a detailed study of supermarket check-out clerks, Ferreras (2007) 
documents that, even when work consists of the most repetitive and dull 
tasks, the workers are confronted with different normativity sources. 
Although they do not question the legitimacy of the efficiency objective, 
they strongly aspire to institute an egalitarian dimension in their 
interactions with colleagues as well as with managers. Workers denounce 
in particular the fact that managerial decisions often benefit some 
workers at the expense of others. For instance, they expect performance 
standards, pay, managerial practices and control procedures to be driven 
by explicit norms of distributive and procedural justice rather than 
arbitrarily set, as often seems to be the case (Ferreras, 2007). Evidence 
has been collected by hundreds of institutional economists, sociologists 
and social psychologists (Cohen-Charash and Spector, 2001) on the 
prevalence of justice motives in behaviour at work – a trait largely 
explored by managers. It is not because the economic sphere is 
dominated by the profit rationale that all acts and behaviours in the 
economic sphere endorse the same instrumental rationality. Workers are 
                                                 
2  Arendt distinguishes the division of labour, which is a principle ruling labour and work, 
from the organising principle, which she exclusively assigns to the public/political 
sphere 
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not always the effort-avoiders and opportunistic individuals depicted in 
mainstream economic models, nor are they the solitary labourers 
depicted by Hannah Arendt. 
In democratic societies, the intersubjective dimension of work cannot be 
discarded, though caution must be taken so that it does not obscure the 
objective circumstances of work. All empirical studies report that the 
workers are deeply subjectively – and hence intersubjectively - engaged 
at work (Simpson, 2009), even when the engagement takes the negative 
form of deliberate withdrawal (Dejours, 2009). On one hand, workers 
value and seek interpersonal interactions for their own sake, not for 
instrumental reasons (Lopes, 2011). On another, these interpersonal 
interactions are expected to conform to the egalitarian interaction regime. 
The workers’ claim to interact democratically with co-workers and 
supervisors as well as the many cooperative facets of work constitutes 
definite instances of the political dimension of work. It suggests that 
action, in the Arendtian sense, does or could take place also in 
workplaces, which would mean that work entails both a public and a 
political dimension.  
The Defining Features of the Public Sphere and the 
Extent to which they apply to the Work Sphere 
Before we can answer our next question - to what extent do workplaces 
entail a public dimension? – some defining features of what is a public 
sphere must be outlined. Previous sections have set the stage. For Arendt 
and Habermas,  workplaces are clearly excluded from the public sphere 
to the extent that they are dominated by instrumental and strategic action.  
Only action (for Arendt) and communicative action (for Habermas) 
belong to the public sphere. Notwithstanding the theoretical divergence 
of the two authors on other aspects, their basic defining characteristic of 
the public sphere is the type of interaction established therein. For 
Arendt, the public sphere emerges whenever and wherever ‘men act 
together in concert’. In other words, according to Arendt and Habermas, 
the extent to which a realm is public depends primarily on the way 
individuals interact and on the conditions in which interactions take 
place. 
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The Distinction Between the Public and the Private in Arendt and 
Habermas 
For Arendt, public is almost synonymous with political (but the relation 
between the two is a perennial debate in political philosophy; see Frazer, 
2009). Therefore, what has been said about work, action and the political 
also applies to work and the public. Arendt characterises the public 
sphere as self-government among distinct and equal individuals freed 
from the bonds of necessity; it stands in opposition to the private sphere 
– households and economic units, characterised by relations of 
domination and governed by necessity. The private is an intimate realm 
sheltered from external scrutiny which deals with production and 
reproduction, while the public denotes a collective body, visible and 
open to all, engaged in deliberating on how one should live with others. 
There is no particular location or institution associated to the public 
sphere; a place becomes public whenever common action coordinated 
through speech and persuasion occurs3 (Benhabib, 1992). 
The preceding sections have sought to argue that there is a political 
dimension of work, to the extent that workers interact as distinct, 
individuated persons able and wanting to participate in the organisation 
of work. It may be inferred from this that work also has a public 
dimension. However, Arendt defines the public as having two basic 
constitutive features: distinctness and equality. While the distinctness 
quality of workers has been addressed in previous sections, the second 
requisite of the public sphere, that of equality, has yet to be examined. 
Like Arendt, Habermas defines the public sphere as a particular type of 
interaction between individuals, namely communicative action, an 
interaction marked by the search for mutual understanding and the non-
manipulative use of language. He sees the public sphere as a theatre 
where citizens debate and deliberate on their common affairs under the 
constraints of an ‘ideal speech situation’. These constraints include that:  
                                                 
3  This means that workplaces could also become public depending on the kind of 
interaction and government that prevails. Indeed, Arendt’s reflections on work 
councils indicate that she does not exclude workplaces from the public sphere. 
However, this contradicts her absolute relegation of labour and work – as all 
economic affairs - to the private sphere. This contradiction raises two issues: the 
first concerns the separation of politics and economics, an issue largely addressed 
in the literature (see Sitton, 1987); while the second concerns Arendt’s very 
conception of work, the issue addressed in the present article 
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each participant must have an equal chance to initiate and 
continue communication; each must have an equal chance to 
make assertions, recommendations and explanations; all must 
have equal chances to express their wishes, desires and feelings; 
and finally, speakers must be free to thematize those power 
relations that in ordinary contexts would constrain the wholly free 
articulation of opinions and positions. Together these conditions 
specify a norm of communication that can be named that of 
egalitarian reciprocity (Benhabib, 1992: 89). 
In the public sphere, therefore, competing particular interests are given 
equal consideration and participants deliberate as peers, in a search for 
consensus over the common interest. It is more than obvious that private 
business workplaces do not satisfy these criteria. Even when workers are 
allowed to express and defend their views, or when they are consulted on 
organisational matters; even in the most participative work environments, 
workplaces can rarely be regarded as collective deliberation arenas. Of 
course, consensus is sometimes reached on given issues but always 
through deliberative processes marked by subordination, since 
postulating the existence of a common good shared by firm owners and 
employees may well be a mystification. 
However, one must not overlook the fact that the workers’ views and 
suggestions are based on normative claims that represent a (constrained) 
thematisation of power relations. Workers have the ability to see things 
not only from their point of view but from the perspective of all the 
actors of the firm – which is the fundamental ability of individuals as 
political beings.  Their judgments are not based on ‘private’ values or 
opinions with a concern only for their individual, private situation; 
rather, they are formed by considering the whole collective of workers 
and grounded on public conceptions of justice (Ferreras, 2007).  
Indeed, contrary to Arendt’s assumptions, ‘labourers’ are not driven 
merely by necessity, nor are ‘workers’ exclusively concerned with 
technical efficiency. Sociological studies show that concerns with justice 
form an integral part of the contemporary experience of work. And 
justice is ‘the good’ that is pursued in politics and debated in the public 
sphere, for it ‘consists in what tends to promote the common interest’ 
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(Pitkin, 1981: 339)4. Justice is precisely about the conflict between profit 
and right, efficiency and meaning, private claim and public policy; it is 
the concept ‘that enables us to make this transition from private to public, 
from ‘I’ to ‘we’’ (Pitkin, 1981: 347). Though perfectly aware of their 
subordinate condition, workers do not abdicate from being treated with 
justice. Clinical evidence on work-related psychological diseases testifies 
the pain and devastation that often result from unfair treatment at work 
(Dejours, 2009). Work is undoubtedly a normative experience because, 
to paraphrase Arendt, ‘men, not Man live on the earth and inhabit the 
world’ (Arendt, 1958: 7) … of work. Though workers lose most of the 
rights they have as citizens when entering workplaces, they do not 
surrender their aspiration to the ‘egalitarian reciprocity’, the interaction 
regime progressively established in democratic societies.  
Yet the existence of an aspiration to equality does not mean that it is 
effective. Arendt and Habermas were certainly right in saying that the 
realm of work will never be a sphere of freedom and equality. We may 
nonetheless hold from the argument developed so far that potentially – 
by which we mean plausibly in analytical terms even though not actually 
realised or realisable – workplaces are public arenas. If the moral and 
normative abilities of individuals are the central institution of politics, 
and indeed of social order, then workplaces have a public dimension too.  
It is because the criterion of equality is so ostensibly absent from the 
world of work that its public character is seldom discussed. But Arendt 
and Habermas’ assumption of strict equality has been criticised for its 
illusory or elitist character.  The issue deserves further examination.  
Equality as a Criterion for a Public Sphere 
In the Arendtian world, (political) action seems reserved to especially 
endowed people. Indeed, action requires perceiving the world and its 
future from a plurality of standpoints; being trusted by citizens - to the 
extent that it involves speaking in the name of others; having the ability 
to persuade others, and having the courage to engage in risky and 
                                                 
4  It is not a coincidence that Arendt, in contrast to Aristotle, excludes the idea of 
justice from the political and public realm (Pitkin, 1981). For Arendt, justice 
cannot be a key political value or principle because it necessarily deals with 
economic and social, not political, circumstances (Frazer, 2009). What is again at 
stake here is the separation of economics and politics. 
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uncertain ventures. So political action is far from easy; as Frazer put it 
(2009: 221), ‘it is a human possibility, not the default setting’. In fact, it 
seems that most people are not up to it and indeed are excluded from it, 
which renders the equality criterion somewhat paradoxical.  
Habermas, in turn, considers that social, economic or status differences 
must be held in suspense when entering the public sphere if people are to 
relate to one another as peers. However, it is illusory to think that the 
‘bracketing’ of inequalities can result in effective equality (Fraser, 1992). 
Social inequalities might contaminate and pervert deliberation, even 
when nobody is formally excluded from participation. Furthermore, 
assuming equality among participants may conceal that they actually 
have unequal cultural endowments and speech capacities. As rhetorical 
skills are unevenly distributed and speech is not power-neutral, 
‘deliberation can function as a mask of domination’ (Fraser, 1992: 119).  
The very possibility of equality in existing societies is hence questioned, 
which raises doubts about the possibility of a public sphere in itself 
(Fraser, 1992). 
But we may change perspective and see equality as the potentially 
equalising outcome of ‘going public’ rather than an a priori requirement. 
This is paradoxically suggested by Arendt herself for whom equality is 
not an original condition; human beings are unequal in resources, 
capacities and status and need to be ‘equalised’ (Arendt, 1958: 215). For 
Arendt, the most equalising institution is open access to the public 
sphere. Equality hence appears as an outcome of action and participation 
in the public sphere rather than a prerequisite to it, which sheds a new 
(normative) light on the equality issue. We argue below that in the sphere 
of work, ‘equalisation’ may be fostered by the implementation of 
participatory workplaces. 
The adoption of this perspective implies loosening (as feminists do) the 
public/private boundaries and qualifying as public all arenas where social 
interactions give rise to experiences of (in)justice and democratic 
aspirations. Workplaces do satisfy such a requisite. As sustained by 
Mahajan (2009), in contemporary democratic societies, the public and 
the private cannot be understood in opposition to each other. Rather, ‘the 
roots of the public are in the private; the public starts when we take 
others into account’ (Kaminski, 1991: 265). 
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Normative Implications of the Recognition of the Public 
Character of Work  
Contesting and Redefining the Public-Private Boundaries 
Defining what is public is not only an analytical or theoretical matter but 
also a major political issue. In Benhabib’s words (1992: 84), ‘all 
struggles against oppression in the world begin by redefining what has 
previously been considered private, nonpublic, and nonpolitical issues as 
matters of public concern, as issues of justice, as sites of power that need 
discursive legitimation’. Work began to become the focus of public 
attention, and a subject of public intervention, after the workers’ 
struggles of the nineteenth century.   
Of course, it is the private ownership of the means of production and the 
strict separation between the public and the private instituted by liberal 
thought that to a great extent legitimise the private character of work. 
Private property is at the centre of a rhetoric of privacy that has 
historically been used to restrict legitimate public contestation (Fraser, 
1992: 131). Since the means of production are privately owned, 
workplaces are assumed to pertain to the private domain and this would 
protect them from public interference. For liberal thought, the private 
sphere is not to be assessed from the standpoint of equality and justice 
and must be placed beyond the scrutiny of the law and the state5.  
But private ownership is not a legitimate reason for the non-recognition 
of the rights of workers as citizens. Once one accepts the principle, 
constitutive of democracies, of equal and fair treatment for all, no 
domain can be sheltered from the concerns of justice. Yet as Mahajan 
noted (2009: 139), while it is by now widely accepted that public 
concerns of justice and equality must apply to all forms of social 
interaction, there has been little effort to re-articulate the relationship 
between the private and the public. It is essential to democracy that the 
public-private boundaries are redrawn and reflection is given to how 
each sphere complements and interconnects with the other rather than 
                                                 
5  Feminists have been the most active and effective in criticising the strict separation 
between the public and the private (see, among others, Benhabib, 1992; Mahajan, 
2009). Their argument, according to which the distinction between the private and 
the public furthers the subordination of women to the family and protects 
patriarchy, can plainly be extended to workers and firms 
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considering them as separate and exclusive spheres.  
Applied to the sphere of work, this means that the workers should have 
the right to reflexively question the issues affecting them and challenge 
what is or should be public and private. The European diversity in 
workers’ collective rights shows that private ownership does not 
constitute a legitimate factor to prevent workers’ participation at different 
decision-making levels. Competition imperatives, ownership 
prerogatives and managerial concerns have been advanced to exclude 
issues like work intensification, among others, from public and political 
debate. Yet the scope of the public debate must not be restricted by 
economic privacy. Whenever the consequences of private economic 
decisions affect public health or local communities, the issues must be 
opened to public scrutiny. 
In fact, firms themselves face a permanent tension between conflicting 
sets of values, namely values belonging to the public versus private 
realms. Because cooperation is required for the good functioning of 
productive organisations, firms increasingly call for public values in their 
managerial discourses and practices to foster workers’ involvement. For 
instance, some firms combine strict hierarchical structures with 
egalitarian interpersonal relations between workers and managers 
(Ferreras, 2007: 113-124). Others implement systems of employee 
voicing and build corporate cultures pervaded by values and principles 
characteristic of the public sphere. However, the latter stand in blatant 
contradiction with the values invoked to legitimate privacy and non-
interference in management decisions. Normative elements imported 
from the public sphere - such as the right to have a voice - are hence 
brought into play, and perversely often prevent work from going public. 
Indeed, these discourses and practices are sometimes implemented to 
avoid unionisation and promote the workers’ identification with the 
organisation rather than their emancipation. The result is organisational 
manipulation and the perpetuation of oppression in the name of 
overcoming it (Alvesson and Willmott, 1992).  
What we have tried to emphasise is that the denial of the political and 
public dimension of work and workplaces may conceal the actual 
intertwining of the public and the private in productive organisations and 
undermine a sound analysis of both its destructive and constructive 
potential.  
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Recognizing the Public Dimension of Work - Towards Participatory 
Workplaces 
Work began to progressively enter the public sphere with the first labour 
laws at the end of the nineteenth century. In the constitution of the 
International Labour Organisation of 1944 (ILO, 1994) the aim is that 
‘the representatives of workers and employers, enjoying equal status with 
those of governments, join with them in free discussion and democratic 
decision with a view to the promotion of the common welfare’. All 
constitutive features of Arendt and Habermas’ public sphere are present: 
work is recognized a matter of common interest, subject to public 
deliberation among participants presumed free and equal. The ILO’s 
constitution was inspired by the industrial democracy movement which 
advocates the establishment of institutional mechanisms for worker 
representation and it gave rise to a broad range of industrial relations 
systems in the western world6. 
But in fact, it is not work itself but the conditions of employment (hiring 
and firing provisions, wages’ levels and evolution, working hours, 
representation rights) that form the core of what is negotiated in 
collective bargaining instances. The lack of distinction between 
employment and work has narrowed the scope of bargaining and has 
actually been an obstacle in rendering the conditions of work a public 
matter. Indeed, in most cases social dialogue ends up compensating 
workers on a monetary basis for the consequences of alienation at work, 
considered inevitable by most trade unions because of the rationalization 
of work occurred in the beginning of the 20th century. Managerial 
authority in the workplace has been considered legitimate and the 
transformation of work itself disappeared from political debate (Trentin, 
2012). By contrast, what is argued here is that work must be placed back 
where it belongs, that is, at the core of politics. Like pay, safety at work 
or working hours, questions related to controlling work intensity, 
workloads, work tasks and procedures and work organisation should be 
                                                 
6  It might be noted, however, that the legitimated rights of workers are increasingly 
being seen as an impediment to economic performance. Indeed, the opinion that 
labour regulations constrain flexibility and inflate labour costs is now widespread, 
as is the idea that strikes interfere with other citizens' exercise of freedom. In other 
words, the historically established publicness of work is seriously threatened. 
Union power is declining and work-related decisions are increasingly subjugated 
to economic concerns 
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transformed from private business practices to matters of public concern. 
The normative counterpart of our analytical argument, that work has a 
public dimension, is the application of the basic principle of the public 
sphere, namely the maximum possible participation of all those involved, 
to workplaces. And this entails both direct participation at workplace 
level and representative participation in high-level decision instances. 
Direct voicing and participatory schemes have been denounced as an 
‘integrationist’ management agenda (Ramsay, 1983; Hyman and Mason, 
1995) on the grounds that they may weaken unions, manipulate workers 
and break their solidarity. However, participatory workplaces and 
representative participation systems do not preclude each other. On the 
contrary, the latter is proven to be an important pre-condition for 
effective direct participation (Hyman and Mason, 1995).  
It should be noted that, for direct participation not to be confused with 
management techniques aimed at organisational efficiency, the orthodox 
authority structure must be modified, which in turn implies a shift of 
power from management to labour. The question then arises of the limits, 
the pace and the actors involved in the democratisation of work. There 
are four strategies for easing political constraints so that reforms can be 
enacted (Roland, 2002: 32): a) compensating losers; b) making only 
partial reforms; c) creating institutions to make reforms credible; and d) 
waiting for the deterioration of the status quo to make reforms more 
attractive. In the sphere of work and in present times, only the second 
and third possibilities seem relevant. 
In a first step, a solution for representative participation would be the 
progressive and timely generalisation of the German Mitbestimmung 
governance structure. Institutional changes in corporate governance law 
would be required in most countries to give workers an effective say in 
high-level management decisions, which entails workers’ representatives 
holding around half of the seats on the boards of companies. One must 
nonetheless bear in mind that such changes are only successful when 
backed by cultural ‘invisible institutions’, namely organizational trust, 
legitimate management and recognised authority (Le Gall, 2011). The 
role and national culture of trade unions is in this respect a crucial 
building block. 
Of course, co-determination does not make the conflicts of interests 
disappear; it only ensures that employers understand that it is in their 
interest to elicit the consent of workers. Co-determination is a 
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sophisticated and advanced way to manage consent and control of 
workers.  
In a second step, we could imagine an ‘economic bicameralism’ within 
firms which would institute two representative bodies to govern firms in 
the interest of ‘labour and capital investors’ alike (Ferreras, 2012). This 
system would allow the instrumental rationality of the capital investors - 
focused on economic efficiency - to be articulated with the political 
rationality of the labour investors - rooted in the standard of democratic 
justice. It would require a radical change in formal governance rules that 
would only take place under pressure from powerful political struggles 
against the degradation of work. This ‘bicameralism’ would embody the 
recognition of the existence of two constituent bodies driven by two 
incommensurable rationalities and the need for these bodies to govern 
together. 
The democratisation of work requires both enhanced representative and 
direct participation, the aim of which is to give workers more control 
over what they do. Direct participation has taken many forms in the last 
decades and across countries and it seems that cultural specificities do 
shape the extent to which direct participation actually results in enhanced 
discretion at work and quality of working life (Godard, 2007). But 
experience shows that the most crucial factor for success is that the form 
of direct participation is not driven by top-down processes but emerges 
from the collective of work itself. A basic requirement is that workers 
understand how their tasks contribute functionally to joint production 
within and across units. Based on this knowledge, the workers could 
form ‘work collectives’, together with their representatives, to decide on 
the style of cooperation and coordination, on how binding decisions are 
to be made and on which responsibilities to assign to each worker (Le 
Gall, 2011). While this implies a weakening of the command and control 
structures, of reporting procedures and of the established division 
between conception and execution generally, it cannot entirely eliminate 
management authority. As noted, such managerial changes can only 
occur if complemented by the institutional changes in corporate 
governance and representative participation outlined below. 
All these normative recommendations follow from our analytical 
argument but the beneficial effects of these changes in work organisation 
on life in society are worth mentioning. Namely, the organisation of 
work is recognised as having an educative function on civic spirit and 
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civic skills. The idea that social institutions have a psychological impact 
on men’s character and that participatory institutions provide a major 
opportunity to acquire political abilities was developed, among others, by 
John Stuart Mill (1848/1969). Building on Mill’s insights, Pateman 
(1970) argues that direct participation at work is an essential element of 
democracy to the extent that it contributes to developing the qualities 
needed for responsible public action - self-confidence, public-
spiritedness, disposition to cooperate, which results in enhanced political 
participation. That is, the more control and influence individuals exercise 
over their work life, the better equipped and inclined they are to 
participate in community life. Empirical evidence has been collected that 
supports this thesis (Karasek and Theorell, 1990; Schur 2003; Godard 
2007; Lopes et al, 2014) but the study of the articulation between life at 
work and life in society remains an under-researched topic. 
Mill and Pateman’s claims are plainly consistent with the argument 
developed in the present article. Indeed, if work has a political and public 
dimension, as argued here, it is but logical that workplaces are arenas 
where workers acquire and ‘train’ political skills and public spirit. Work 
plays an educative role in political and civic matters precisely because it 
has a political and public dimension.  
For Pateman, in the absence of the vital training ground of low level 
participation, only few workers (certainly the best educated) would take 
up the opportunity offered in a democratised system. That is, 
participation is cumulative and self-sustaining in effect. Workplaces are 
essential elements of democracy because they may provide the 
opportunity to learn what is required for the advent of more advanced 
democratic societies. Participation at work, i.e. the democratisation of 
authority structures, is a prerequisite for a democratic polity. 
Unfortunately, observed trends go precisely against the desired 
evolution. The strengthening of European social dialogue proposed by 
the European Union and its legislation on co-determination and works 
councils contrast with the recommendations to decentralise collective 
bargaining and the weakening of collective bargaining institutions and 
rights observed in the last years. Workers, even when consulted, report 
that their voice is not actually taken into account. Current management 
criteria lead to the interests of workers being disregarded in favour of 
those of shareholders, and to the detriment of the common good. 
Contrary to what would be desirable for democracy, firms are isolating 
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themselves from society in not attending the legitimate demand for 
participation at work. Such evolution causes the erosion of the ‘elevated’ 
traits of character needed for public action and may well be at the root of 
the present political desertion and erosion of civic solidarities. The fact is 
that nowadays work is one of the main socialising agents. As Marx 
argued, the social ties that people forge in the sphere of production have 
a major bearing on the way that people think and behave (Spencer, 
2009). Likewise, for Cleghorn (2007: 307), ‘society itself is produced 
and reproduced along the lines of relations found at work’. Based on the 
analysis of the relations between work and democracy, a ‘policy of 
work’, concentrated on the organisation of work and based on another 
vision of work, should be promoted by appropriate public intervention 
(Dejours, 2009).  
Concluding Remarks  
The aim of this article has been to argue, contra mainstream economists 
and also contra Hannah Arendt and Jurgen Habermas, that work goes 
beyond instrumentality and has a political and public dimension. Two 
main arguments ground our claim. Firstly, the conception of work must 
situate it in contemporary societies and consequently acknowledge that 
the aspiration to an egalitarian interaction regime permeates all work 
experience. Secondly, work involves cooperative endeavours which call 
on the moral ability of individuals, that is, their ability and will to go 
beyond instrumentality and commit to a shared goal. Behaving according 
to normative concerns and interacting with others with a view to ‘acting 
in concert’ constitute precisely the major features of the public sphere.  
However, even though work as experienced by workers entails a public 
dimension, the domination and inequality that define private business 
workplaces rule them out of the public sphere as defined by Arendt and 
Habermas, and are progressively withdrawing work matters from the 
actual public sphere. Hence the need to contest the boundaries of the 
public and the private. The normative claims that derive from these 
analytical arguments point towards the democratisation of work in the 
form of both more participatory workplaces and strengthened 
representative participation. In fact, conceiving work as a depoliticised 
and private activity conceals the various conflictualities it conveys both 
for workers and firms and undermines a sound analysis of the 
26     JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY  No 76 
 
constructive potential of the public character of work. 
The distinctive methodological feature of our approach is the focus on 
the intersubjective dimension. This dimension is downplayed by the 
individualist framework of mainstream economics. In contrast, taking 
interactions between individuals as the ultimate unit of analysis has long 
constituted the methodological hallmark of institutional economics. By 
conceiving work as an activity relating individuals with nature rather 
than with each other, mainstream economists withdraw it from the 
political domain.  Concentrating on the interpersonal level of analysis, 
however, allows us to unveil the political dimension of work and relate it 
to the public sphere. It also shows the limits of the otherwise laudable 
contributions by Habermas and Arendt. Their theoretical constructions 
were aimed at denouncing the transformation of contemporary societies 
into consumer societies in which the public sphere is being taken over by 
economic concerns and instrumental reason. But in reducing work to 
necessity and instrumentality, they contributed to condemning the work 
concept to a subaltern theoretical status, thus involuntarily reinforcing 
the derogatory mainstream economics approach to work. We are 
attempting instead to re-dignify the concept of work, so central in the 
works of the nineteenth century classical economists, and retrieve its 
emancipatory potential. We thereby seek to show that the study of work 
warrants a central place and further consideration within modern 
heterodox economics. 
To use Arendt’s words against herself, the danger of the instrumental 
conception of work is that ‘the trouble with modern theories is not that 
they are wrong but that they could become true [… ending …] in the 
most sterile passivity history has ever known’ (Arendt, 1958: 342). The 
denial of the political and public dimension of work might well be 
undermining democracy. It is necessary to make work public to 
legitimatise and stimulate action towards reversing current trends in the 
world of work. 
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